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I. INTRODUCTION
For more than a century, the dominant theory of redress for lia-
bility for unintended harm has been negligence.1 "Leading cases are
filled with resounding affirmations, such as that of Commissioner Earl
in Losee v. Buchanan: ' . . . the rule is, at least in this country, a uni-
versal one, which, so far as I can discern, has no exceptions or limita-
tions, that no one can be made liable for injuries to the person or
property of another without some fault or negligence on his part.'
2
The necessary elements to bring a claim founded upon such negli-
gence have traditionally been stated as follows: a legally recognized
duty to protect others against foreseeable risk; a breach of that duty; a
connection between the conduct and the resulting injury, commonly
known as causation or "proximate cause"; and the occurrence of actual
loss or damages to another.3
On many occasions, the law of negligence needs no other formu-
lation besides the duty of reasonable care. Other cases, however, pre-
sent circumstances rendering application of that general standard
difficult, if not impossible. This difficulty has been recognized by
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1. ROBERT L. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 1 (4th ed. 1995) (citing Losee v.
Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873)).
2. Id.
3. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at
164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
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courts considering liability for mental and emotional distress. 4 The
imposition of such liability is made even more confusing when such a
claim is brought by a bystander who is not physically injured.' The
traditional argument is that the imposition of such liability unocca-
sioned by any physical impact may lead to "mere conjecture and
speculation.",6 Thus, the "task [put to modern courts] involves the
refinement of principles of liability to remedy violations of reasonable
care" 7 while avoiding speculative results which would allow juries to
impose liability that is not commensurate with the culpability of a
defendant's conduct.8
Unfortunately, Washington law only complicates a court's posi-
tion. As set out in Hegel v. McMahon, Washington courts, in some
circumstances, do not require a bystander to be present at the time of
the injury-causing event to state a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. 9 For example, a family member may recover for
emotional distress if he or she merely arrives at the scene "shortly after
an accident and before substantial change has occurred in the victim's
condition or location."' 10
In responding to the alternative theory of recovery, some may
argue that permitting the recovery of damages for injury to third per-
sons will allow limitless recoveries and have ruinous consequences
because such indirect losses appear to be open-ended. Many critics of
such an extension of liability quote the oft-cited statement of Judge
Cardozo that such liability would be ".... liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."" The
4. Id. § 54, at 360-61.
5. Id. at 360. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A provides: "If the actor's conduct
is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional distur-
bance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm... the
actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance."
6. Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 526 (N.J. 1980).
7. Id.
8. See Julie A. Greenberg, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Proposal for a Con-
sistent Theory of Tort Recovery for Bystanders and Direct Victims, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1283, 1287
(1992).
9. See Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash. 2d 122, 132, 960 P.2d 424, 429 (1998). In two
consolidated actions, Hegel v. McMahon and Marzolf v. Stone, the plaintiffs sought damages for
the emotional trauma they experienced after witnessing an injured family member's suffering at
the scene of the accident where the injury occurred. In each case, the plaintiffs came upon the
injured family member soon after the injury occurred, but did not actually witness the accident
or the injury.
10. Id. The rule explicitly requires that the plaintiff's emotional distress be reasonable, and
the plaintiff must present objective symptoms of the distress that are susceptible to medical diag-
nosis and proved through qualified evidence. Id. at 132, 960 P.2d at 430 (citing Hunsley v.
Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 436, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976)).
11. See, e.g., Migliori v. Airborne Freight Corp. 690 N.E.2d 413, 418 (Mass. 1998) (quot-
ing Ultramares v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441,444 (N.Y. 1931)).
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relevant question concerns not simply recovery in an individual case,
but the consequences and effects of a rule of law that would permit
that recovery.
This Comment examines the route taken by the Supreme Court
of Washington to afford plaintiffs their day in court while potentially
forcing certain tortfeasors to pay for plaintiffs' emotional distress
claims. This Comment will also examine the framework that claim-
ants and Washington courts need for evaluating a bystander's claims
of negligent infliction of emotional distress. The framework should be
free of artificial, vague, and inconsistent rules, and should allow plain-
tiffs to recover for negligently inflicted severe emotional distress while
protecting tortfeasors from spurious claims, including claims con-
cerning minor psychic and emotional shocks, and from liability dis-
proportionate to culpability. Moreover, the "societal benefits of
certainty in the law, as well as traditional concepts of tort law, dictate
the certain limitation of bystander recovery of damages for emotional
distress."12
Part II provides some background on emotional distress claims.
Part III summarizes two recent cases in this area of tort law and the
courts' analyses, then reviews and critiques the court opinions dealing
with "shortly thereafter" language. Finally, Part IV recommends a
different approach to resolving inconsistent treatment of bystander
emotional distress claims.
II. BACKGROUND CASE LAW ON BYSTANDER
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS
Present case law in the area of bystander negligent infliction of
emotional distress has evolved according to the dictates of public pol-
icy-that a defendant must answer for the consequences of his or her
own actions, however little intended and however unforeseen. Which-
ever theory of recovery one considers in this area of tort law, one is
sure to encounter considerable difficulty associated with setting a
boundary for liability.
Some jurisdictions which have found liability for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress upon a bystander have placed limits on
this type of negligence liability consistent with their view of the indi-
vidual interest being injured.'3 Although a defendant's duty to a
12. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989).
13. See id. at 828-29.
Emotional distress is an intangible condition experienced by most persons, even
absent negligence, at some time during their lives. Close relatives suffer serious, even
debilitating, emotional reactions to the injury, death, serious illness, and evident suf-
fering of loved ones. These reactions occur regardless of the cause of the loved one's
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potential plaintiff is often analyzed in terms of foreseeability, such
analysis could result in an unlimited class of plaintiffs and injuries.
After all, it is certainly foreseeable from a factual standpoint that many
persons, including strangers, may experience emotional distress as the
result of any given accident or injury.14 Furthermore, it is clearly more
foreseeable that a close family member will experience severe emo-
tional distress upon merely learning of the injury to or death of a loved
one.
15
Since 1968 some United States jurisdictions have recognized a
duty toward people who were not touched or endangered in the acci-
dent, provided that certain other criteria were met. This approach is
commonly named after the California case that originated it, Dillon v.
Legg1 6
In this landmark case, California became the first jurisdiction to
allow a bystander who was not in any physical danger to recover for
the emotional distress that arose upon viewing injuries to a third per-
son. 7 In Dillon, a mother and sister witnessed an automobile strike
and kill a family member.1" The California Supreme Court awarded
the mother damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress
proximately caused by the driver who struck and killed her daughter.19
The Dillon court thereby overruled prior case law requiring that the
emotional distress plaintiff be within the "zone of danger."2"
The Dillon court enunciated a then-novel three-factor test for
other courts to follow in determining whether a defendant owed the
emotionally distressed plaintiff a duty of care.21 The courts will take
into account such factors as: whether the plaintiff was located near the
scene of the accident, as contrasted with one who was a distance away;
illness, injury, or death. That relatives will have severe emotional distress is an
unavoidable aspect of the inner "human condition." The emotional distress for which
monetary damages may be recovered, however, ought not to be that form of acute
emotional distress or the transient emotional reaction to the occasional gruesome or
horrible incident to which every person may potentially be exposed in an industrial
and sometimes violent society.
Id.
14. Paul V. Calandrella, Note, Safe Haven for a Troubled Tort: A Return to the Zone of
Danger for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 79, 84 (1992).
15. Id.
16. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
17. See id.
18. Id. at 914.
19. Id. at 925.
20. Id. (overruling Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963)).
21. Id. at 920. Nearly half of the states, including Washington, elected to follow in Dillon's
footsteps by allowing bystanders (usually close relatives) outside the zone of danger to recover
damages under some circumstances for emotional distress caused by witnessing the injury to a
third party. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 549 n.10 (1994).
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whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon the
plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the
accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after
its occurrence; and whether the plaintiff and the victim were closely
related, as opposed to the absence of any relationship or the presence
of only a distant relationship.22
The first factor discussed in Dillon-that the plaintiff be near the
injured person-is the central issue in the Washington courts' recent
obfuscation in this area of tort law. The physical proximity is relevant
to show the closeness of the emotional bond between the plaintiff and
the injured family member and the resulting harm to the plaintiff. For
example, one would generally suppose that the risk of emotional dis-
tress to a brother who is halfway across the country is not as great as
the risk to a mother or father who is at the scene of the accident.
However, others have argued that the risk of emotional injury exists
by virtue of the plaintiffs perception of the accident, not his proximity
to it.21
A. Analysis of the Elements of Emotional Distress Claim
In addition to debating whether the plaintiff is owed a duty and
what the plaintiff actually observes, we must examine the basic princi-
ples underlying the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The Dillon court held that liability could be circumscribed in these
types of cases, as in all tort cases, by the application of the general
principles of negligence.24
Courts interpreting the Dillon factors have emphasized that a
plaintiff will more likely suffer when physically close to an accident.25
Moreover, courts have determined that an individual observing an
accident firsthand will likely suffer greater trauma than one learning of
it later.26
22. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920, see also Consolidated Rail, 512 U.S. at 549 n.11.
23. "The distance from the scene and time of notice of the accident are quite inconsequen-
tial for the shock more likely results from the relationship with the injured party than what is
seen of the accident." Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969).
24. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 924.
25. See Dunphy v. Gregory, 642 A.2d 372, 375 (1994) (citing John L. Diamond, Dillon v.
Legg Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory of Compensating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible
Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L. J. 477, 487-89 (1984)).
26. See Diamond, supra note 25, at 488.
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1. "Danger Zone"
The time-honored case of Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.
27
articulates the principles underlying the zone of danger rule that Dillon
applied as its first element. Palsgraf limited defendants' duties to
exercise reasonable care to an area in which their actions could foresee-
ably physically endanger others.28  The zone of danger rule requires
the plaintiff to be the object of immediate threat of harm. Thus, under
the zone of danger rule, a bystander not threatened with physical harm
does not have a cause of action to recover for emotional distress. 29 For
example, a person who witnessed a loved one being run over would
not have a cause of action under the zone of danger analysis unless she
was proximately located so that it would be reasonable for her to
30believe that she too would be run over.
California was the first state to abandon the zone of danger rule.3
The Dillon court reasoned that to deny the mother's cause of action
would be to draw artificial lines.32 The particular facts of Dillon
graphically illustrated the artificial lines of the zone of danger rule.
33
2. Symptoms of Actual Distress (Impact Rule)
From around the turn of the century, courts established that a
plaintiff needed to have suffered some kind of physical impact in the
course of events leading up to her mental injury to recover emotional
distress damages. 34 This is commonly known as the "impact rule" and
was applied by Dillon as its second factor.3" The view that damages
for nonphysical injury were mere trifles, and hence not the concern of
the law, was challenged by cases where a plaintiff suffered some physi-
27. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
28. Id. at 100 (finding a duty to those within range of apprehension).
29. See Elizabeth Handsley, Mental Injury Occasioned by Harm to Another: A Feminist Cri-
tique, 14 LAW & INEQ. 391, 418 (1996).
30. Plaintiff Marzolf's Brief in Response to Defendant Snohomish County School District's
[School District] Motion for Summary Judgment at 20, Marzolf v. Stone, No. 93-2-05005-2
(Snohomish County Super. Ct. filed Sept. 3, 1993).
31. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
32. Id. at 925.
33. The deceased's sister was also a witness to the accident, but the sister was a few yards
closer to the accident and was therefore arguably within the zone of danger. The application of
the zone of danger rule would allow the sister to recover for emotional distress while barring the
mother's action because she was slightly further away and not within the zone of danger. See
Plaintiff Marzolf's Brief in Response to Defendant School District's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment at 20-21, Marzolf v. Stone, No. 93-2-05005-2 (Snohomish County Super. Ct. filed Sept. 3,
1993).
34. See Thomas T. Uhl, Bystander Emotional Distress: Missing an Opportunity to Strengthen




cal consequences of his or her fright; one such example is that of a
pregnant woman suffering a miscarriage.36 Finding it difficult to
regard such an injury as trivial, courts found other justifications for
denying recovery, such as the danger of a flood of fabricated claims
and the difficulty of proving factual causation.37 The "impact rule"
was thought to satisfactorily avoid those two main difficulties. 38
Other state courts "adopted the 'impact rule' under which plain-
tiffs could recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress only
when they had suffered a contemporaneous physical injury or physical
impact on their person. '39  The rule seemed very precise and strin-
gent. However, factual circumstances "inevitably arose that did not
satisfy the requirements of the impact rule."4 In such cases, "some
courts stretched the concepts of physical injury and physical impact
where justice seemed to call for compensation."41 Where courts were
less inventive, the rule proved unsatisfactory because it barred plain-
tiffs from recovering even when they could establish a causal link




Dillon's third element is premised on the idea that relationships
between individuals, both in family units and as individuals, are fun-
damental to human society.43 The boundaries of negligently inflicted
bystander emotional distress are properly defined using relational
interests as a touchstone.44
Consistent with this idea, in Washington, a person must merely
be a relative to maintain a negligently inflicted emotional distress
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. See Alvan Brody, Negligently Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 VILL. L.
REV. 232, 233-35 (1961-62).




43. See THEODORE LIDZ, THE PERSON: His DEVELOPMENT THROUGHOUT THE LIFE
CYCLE (3d ed. 1968) cited in Uhl, supra note 34, at 1407.
44. Uhl, supra note 34, at 1407-09. The California Supreme Court narrowed the relation-
ship factor of Dillon to allow recovery only by members of a victim's family. Elden v. Sheldon,
758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988). The Elden court denied the plaintiff recovery because she was merely
a cohabitant of the deceased, rather than a legally married spouse. The court emphasized the
state's interest in legal marriage, difficulties in assessing the closeness of nonmarital relationships,
and the need to limit defendants' liability. Id. at 589-90.
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action.4" This requirement is intended to promote stability and guard
against the "specter of unlimited liability to third parties."46 Other
jurisdictions have proposed that a bystander who suffers significant
emotional distress should be permitted to maintain an action when an
individual with whom the bystander has the functional equivalent of a
traditional family relationship is physically injured.47
B. Progeny of Dillon v. Legg
In the years following Dillon, this area of the law was so ambigu-
ous that courts described it as an "amorphous nether realm"4 with
"murky waters."49 The California courts were notable in their incon-
sistent application of the Dillon factors."0
For example, in Ochoa v. Superior Court, the California Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff could only recover if he or she both
observed the defendant's conduct and the resultant injury and was
aware of the conduct and injury at the time of the injury being
caused.5 The underlying issue of when the plaintiff arrived upon the
accident scene was not a critical factor.5 2 What became critical were
various courts' erroneous interpretations of Ochoa. For example, the
Alaska Supreme Court in Croft v. Wicker 3 erroneously interpreted
Ochoa by stating that the Dillon factors were mere guidelines rather
than requirements.54 The Croft court, preferring a liberal interpreta-
tion of Dillon, allowed an action for emotional distress by parents who
were in the vicinity of their daughter when she was sexually
molested."
The California Supreme Court responded to this ambiguity by
narrowing the Dillon reach in Elden v. Sheldon. 6 In Elden, the court
limited Dillon by allowing recovery only when the victim was a mem-
45. See Cunningham v. Lockard, 48 Wash. App. 38, 44-45, 736 P.2d 305, 308 (1987)
(adopting policy guidelines from the tort of outrage).
46. Uhl, supra note 34, at 1401.
47. Id. at 1465 (citing Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985)).
48. Newton v. Kaiser Foundations Hospitals, 228 Cal. Rptr. 890, 893 Cal. Ct. App.
(1986); see also Thing v. La Chusa, 231 Cal. Rptr. 439, 444 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), rev'd, 771 P.2d
814 (Cal. 1989).
49. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
50. See S. Claire Swift, Bystander Liability After Dunphy v. Gregor-A Proposal for a New
Definition of the Bystander, 15 REV. LITIG. 579, 581-82 (1996).
51. See Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985).
52. The plaintiff in Ochoa was at the scene of the negligent conduct. Id. at 3-4.
53. Croft v. Wicker, 737 P.2d 789 (Alaska 1987).
54. Id. at 790-91.
55. Id. at 790.
56. 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988).
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ber of the plaintiff's immediate family. 7 The Elden court denied the
plaintiff recovery because she was merely a cohabitant of the deceased,
rather than a legally married spouse."
In an effort to further clear the water, the California court in
Thing v. LaChusa,"9 expressly stated, "the dictum in Ochoa suggesting
that the factors noted in the Dillon guidelines are not essential in
determining whether a plaintiff is a foreseeable victim of [sic] defen-
dant's negligence should not be relied on."6 In Thing, the court held
that a mother who did not witness the accident involving her child
being struck by a car could not recover damages from the driver for
emotional distress.61 In effect, Thing turned the Dillon foreseeability
guidelines into doctrinal barriers.62
Some twenty years after Dillon, the California Supreme Court
recognized in Thing that visual perception of an accident was required
to recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.63 By this
measure, the Thing court continued to refine Dillon. Specifically, the
Thing court limited the scope of the defendant's duty to third party
bystanders.64
C. The "Sensory and Contemporaneous Observance of the Accident"
Requirement Finds Support in Jurisdictions Nationwide
A survey of our states reveals that an increasing number of juris-
dictions are following California's lead by allowing bystanders outside
of the physical zone of danger to recover damages under certain cir-
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
60. Id. at 830.
61. Id. at 881.
62. The Thing court specifically held that a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional
distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury to a family member only if the plain-
tiff is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs. Id. at 829.
63. See id. at 821-22 (citing Krause v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022 (1977)) (discussing the Cali-
fornia decisions that held visual perception was not required). In Krause, the California Supreme
Court allowed a husband to maintain a claim for shock resulting from "perceiving" his wife was
killed in a collision while she was unloading groceries from the car. The court emphasized that
while the husband did not actually see his wife being struck by defendant's car, he contempo-
raneously perceived the accident and its likely effect through other than visual means. Krause,
502 P.2d. at 1031.
See also Justus v. Atchinson, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977) (cited in Thing, 771 P.2d at 821-22).
In Justus, the court refused to allow a husband to recover for shock resulting from his observa-
tion, while his wife was in labor, of allegedly negligent medical malpractice resulting in the death
of the fetus. The court found that the husband's anxiety did not ripen into the disabling shock
which resulted from the death of the fetus until he was actually informed of that event. Id. at
136.
64. Thing, 771 P.2d 814.
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cumstances. 65  However, several of those jurisdictions have denied
such recovery for close family members who were not physically
pres??ent at the time of the accident, even though they may have
arrived moments after the injury-producing accident.66  These
jurisdictions require a direct sensory and contemporaneous observance
of the accident, which occurs when "the relative contemporaneously
observes the tortious conduct and has no time to brace his or her
emotional system.,
67
For example, in Mazzagatti v. Everingham, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant,
stating, "where the close relative is not present at the scene of the acci-
dent, but instead learns of the accident from a third party, the close
relative's knowledge of the injury to the victim serves as a buffer
against full impact of observing the accident scene... [h]ence, the
critical element for establishing such liability is the contemporaneous
observance of the injury to the close relative. ' 61 In Mazzagatti, the
plaintiff had not met the critical element of contemporaneous obser-
vance of the injury to her daughter. Similarly, in Yandrich v. Radic,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that there was no cause of
action because there was no contemporaneous observance of the acci-
dent by the claimant.69
65. See, e.g., Daley v. LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390 (Mich. 1970). A growing number of
states have adopted the Dillon rule or have expanded liability even further to allow recovery for
bystanders. See, e.g., Haught v. Maceluch, 681 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1982); D'Amico v. Alvarez
Shipping Co., 326 A.2d 129 (Conn. 1973); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981);
Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc. 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982).
66. See Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759 (Ohio 1983); Fineran v. Pickett, 465 N.W.2d
(Iowa 1991) (the victim's father was riding his bicycle some distance behind her and subse-
quently arrived at the injury scene approximately two minutes after the collision).
See also Brooks v. Decker, 516 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1986). In Brooks, the plaintiff was driving
home when an ambulance passed him and turned onto the street where he lived. The ambulance
stopped where a crowd of people had gathered. The plaintiff, who had allowed the ambulance,
noticed a bicycle that belonged to his son on the ground. As plaintiff got out of his vehicle, he
discovered that his son had been the victim of an automobile accident while he had been riding
his bicycle. The plaintiffs son was in a coma for ten days following the accident and suffered
severe and permanent brain damage as a result.
See also Freeman v. City of Pasadena, 744 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1988). In Freeman, the plaintiff
sought to recover damages for his emotional distress allegedly caused by the negligent defendant
in an automobile accident in which two of the plaintiffs stepsons were injured. Upon hearing of
the accident, the plaintiff hurried to the scene where he saw one of his injured stepsons; the other
stepson had already been transported to the hospital where he later died.
67. Mazzagatti v. Everingham, 516 A.2d 672, 679 (Pa. 1986).
68. Id. at 679. After receiving a telephone call alerting her that her daughter had been
involved in an automobile accident, the plaintiff mother arrived at the scene of the accident min-
utes afterward and saw her daughter's body lying in the street.
69. Yandrich v. Radic, 433 A.2d 459, 461 (Pa. 1986). The father arrived at the hospital
and stayed with his injured son until his son's death, five days later.
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The state of Texas also requires a sensory and contemporaneous
observance of the accident.7 ° As the Texas Supreme Court noted in
United Services Automobile Association v. Keith, "Texas law still
requires the bystander's presence when the injury occurred and the
contemporaneous perception of the accident."'" In Keith, plaintiffs
were not present at the time of the fire and, because they did not dis-
cover until some time afterwards which relatives had died or been
injured in the fire, they could not fulfill the requirements for bystand-
er recovery under Texas law.72
New Hampshire is yet another state that denies a bystander rela-
tive's claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress if the element
requiring emotional impact from the sensory and contemporaneous
observance of the accident was not met.73 In Nutter v. Frisbee Memo-
rial Hospital, the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied its own ver-
sion of the Dillon test.74 The Nutter court held that the parents of a
child who died as a result of the alleged malpractice of the defendant
doctor could not bring a bystander action because their emotional dis-
tress did not result from the parents' sensory perception contempora-
neous with the accident. 7' The New Hampshire Supreme Court did
not base its decision in dismissing the claim on the fact that it arose in
the medical malpractice context. Rather, it held that a bystander
claim cannot be allowed for every parent who, though not present,
learned of a child's negligently inflicted death.76
D. Bystanders' Emotional Distress Claims in Other Jurisdictions
As previously discussed, nearly half the states presently permit
bystanders outside the zone of danger to obtain recovery for emotional
distress in certain circumstances.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first allowed recovery for neg-
ligently caused mental trauma to plaintiffs not within any zone of per-
sonal physical danger and without any reason to fear for their own
70. See United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Keith, 970 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex. 1998).
71. Id. at 542.
72. See id.
73. See Nutter v. Frisbee Mem'l Hosp., 474 A.2d 584 (N.H. 1984).
74. Id. at 585-86 (citing Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300 (N.H. 1979)).
75. Id. In Nutter, the child was examined but not admitted into the hospital. Three days
later, the parents left her with a babysitter. She developed complications and was rushed to the
hospital where she died. The parents were contacted and went to the hospital where they viewed
the child's body.
76. See id. at 587.
77. Iowa recognized a bystander's claim for emotional distress in Barnhill v. Davis, 300
N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981).
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safety in Sinn v. Burd.7' The Sinn court held that a cause of action
existed "[w]here the bystander was a mother who witnessed the vio-
lent death of her small child and the emotional shock emanated direct-
ly from personal observation of the event. ... ",7
The Wisconsin Supreme Court wrestled with the weight of con-
flicting authority in the area of bystanders' recovery for emotional dis-
tress claims in Bowen v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company."0
There, a vehicle negligently collided with 14-year-old Steven Bowen,
who was riding a bicycle. Steven was gravely injured and died in a
hospital soon after the accident. Steven's mother sought damages for
negligent infliction of emotional distress."1 As the court observed,
According to her amended complaint, [the mother] did not wit-
ness the collision itself; she arrived at the scene a few minutes
after the collision occurred and personally witnessed its violent
and gruesome aftermath. She saw her severely injured son
trapped beneath the defendant's car and also watched the pro-
longed rescue attempt. The complaint asserted that these expe-
riences caused the mother extreme emotional and psychic
injuries with accompanying physical symptoms including hys-
teria, insomnia, nausea and the disruption of work and family
relationships 82
Mrs. Bowen's argument in support of her claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress was that the court should abandon the
so-called "zone of danger" rule it adopted in 1935 in Waube v. War-
rington.83
The Bowen court stated the obvious dilemma and struggle it had
in this issue,84 and went on to describe the fundamental distrust that
courts of previous eras had toward victims claiming emotional dam-
ages."5 At common law, "emotional suffering was deemed genuine
and compensable only if it was associated with a provable physical
injury claim in an accepted tort cause of action."86 Direct victims were
78. 404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979).
79. Id. at 686.
80. 517 N.W.3d 432 (Wis. 1994).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 435.
83. 258 N.W. 497 (Wis. 1935).
84. "The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress has troubled this court and other
courts for many years. Our decision today demands an appraisal of the evolution of our cases on
negligent infliction of emotional distress, especially those arising over the almost 60 years since
our discussion of a bystander's claim in Waube .... Bowen, 517 N.W.3d at 436.
85. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was not recognized in Wisconsin
until 1963. See Alsteen v. Gehl, 124 N.W.2d 312 (Wis. 1963).
86. Bowen, 517 N.W.3d at 437.
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treated as more or less on par with victims of physical injury, whereas
"bystanders" were in a special category. They were not subject to the
normal principles of tort law, and were not owed a duty in relation to
the injury they suffered. Judge Cardozo established the temporal
relationship between duty and foreseeability: "the question of liability
is always anterior to the question of the measure of the consequences
that go with liability."87 The conclusion may be that there is no gen-
eral duty towards the loved ones of the people one endangers physi-
cally through his or her negligent acts.8
III. WASHINGTON LAW ON BYSTANDER EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS CLAIMS
Prior to Hegel, Washington courts held that a plaintiff may
recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress only if
the plaintiff was personally placed in peril by the defendant's negligent
conduct, or if the plaintiff was present at the scene of the defendant's
negligent conduct that resulted in injury to a close family member.8 9
A. Washington's Recognition of Bystander Emotional Distress Claims
Originally, Washington law only allowed for recovery of dam-
ages stemming from emotional and mental suffering if the plaintiff
suffered direct physical injury in an accident.9" However, as early as
1916, this rule was overruled in O'Meara v. Russell, where the Wash-
ington Supreme Court allowed a plaintiff who was not physically
impacted to recover for physical harm caused by fright.9" The rule in
O'Meara was very broad, allowing plaintiffs to recover when an injury
resulted from emotional causes.92
The rule in O'Meara was subsequently narrowed in Frazee v.
Western Dairy Products,93 when the Washington Supreme Court
adopted the "zone of danger" rule.94 The history of the Washington
courts' decisions in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases
87. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
88. See Handsley, supra note 29, at 412.
89. The Washington Supreme Court held that emotional distress damages "were not com-
pensable, even to close family members, unless the plaintiff was present at the scene of the fatal
accident." Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n. v. Fisons, 122 Wash. 2d 299, 321, 858 P.2d 1054,
1065 (1993) (citing Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 114 Wash. 2d 254, 787 P.2d 553 (1990)).
90. Provided that the defendants action was negligent and not willful or intentional. See
Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976).
91. See O'Meara v. Russell, 90 Wash. 557, 156 P. 550 (1916).
92. Id.
93. 182 Wash. 578, 47 P. 1037 (1935).
94. See Hunsley, 87 Wash. 2d at 432-33, 553 P.2d at 1101 (citing Frazee, 182 Wash. 578,
47 P. 1037 (1935)).
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demonstrates the problem with the "zone of danger" doctrine: while it
appears to allay the courts' apprehension of opening the doors to triv-
ial or fraudulent claims and to unlimited liability for a negligent tort-
feasor, its rigid application may prevent redress in deserving cases. Its
companion rules requiring fear for one's own safety and physical
manifestation of emotional distress have the same effect.
1. Hunsley v. Giard
Washington courts first recognized a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress in Hunsley v. Giard;9  taking Dillon's
lead, Washington broke from the zone of danger analysis.96 In Huns-
ley, the Washington Supreme Court replaced the zone of danger's
arbitrary lines with common law negligence principles.97 Thus, under
Hunsley, a plaintiff has a cause of action if the defendant breached his
duty to avoid the negligent infliction of emotional distress to those
foreseeably endangered.9" The Hunsley court concluded that a defend-
ant's duty to avoid the negligent infliction of emotional distress is
dependent in part on the element of foreseeability.99 The element of
foreseeability was further characterized as a question of fact for the
jury to resolve.' 0 However, even the Hunsley court recognized that"adequate limitations" would have to be employed to further admin-
ister and adjudicate this particular tort. 10'
The courts in Washington and other jurisdictions have consis-
tently held that a line must be drawn to define the class of persons
who are entitled to recover for mental suffering, thereby excluding
potential plaintiffs who would otherwise be "foreseeable" from the
standpoint of a jury.0 2
[F]oreseeability of the injury alone is not a useful 'guideline' or a
meaningful restriction on the scope of the [negligent infliction of
emotional distress] action... The Dillon experience confirms
... "[f]oreseeability proves too much". .. "it provides virtually
no limit on liability for nonphysical harm" . . . [it] is not ade-
95. 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976).
96. Id. at 433, 553 P.2d 1096.
97. Id. at 435, 553 P.2d 1103.
98. Id. at 436, 553 P.2d 1103.
99. See Brief of Respondent School District at 4, Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash. 2d 122,
960 P.2d 424 (1998) (No. 65105-1) (citing Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 435 (1976)).
100. See id.
101. Hunsley, 87 Wash. 2d at 435, 553 P.2d at 1103 (cited in Brief of Respondent School
District at 4, Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash. 2d 122, 960 P.2d 424 (1998) (No. 65105-1)).
102. See Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 114 Wash. 2d 254, 260, 787 P.2d 553, 557 (1990) (cited
in Brief of Respondent School District at 23, Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash. 2d 122, 960 P.2d
424 (1998) (No. 65015-1)).
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quate when the damages sought are for an intangible injury. In
order to avoid limitless liability out of proportion to the degree
of a defendant's negligence, and against which it is impossible to
insure without imposing unacceptable costs on those among
whom the risk is spread, the right to recover for negligently
caused emotional distress must be limited.
103
Unfortunately, Washington courts have muddled this rule since
it was first established. The next section explores the beginning of
this obfuscation.
2. Trend Toward Obfuscation: Cunningham v. Lockard
Recognizing that the Hunsley court did not decide the scope of
legal liability, the Washington Court of Appeals for Division Two in
Cunningham v. Lockard,104 expressed its concerns regarding potentially
unlimited liability.0 ' The court also recognized that although cause in
fact is usually a jury question, legal causation is a question of law to be
determined by the court based upon policy considerations.0 6 The
Cunningham court looked to the elements of the tort of outrage, which
require that the plaintiff either be the object of the defendant's actions,
or be an immediate family member of the injured person and present
at the time of the defendant's conduct.
10 7
3. Gain v. Carroll Mill Co.
Nearly ten years after Hunsley first allowed the claim, the Wash-
ington Court of Appeals reasoned that a liability scheme that was lim-
ited by foreseeability alone was contrary to public policy.' The
103. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 826-27 (Cal. 1989).
104. 48 Wash. App. 38, 736 P.2d 305 (1987).
105. "[T]he decision subjects defendants to potentially unlimited liability to virtually any-
one who suffers physical manifestations of emotional distress caused by personal peril or by con-
cern for the peril of another. Because of this virtually unlimited liability, a boundary establishing
the class of persons who can sue must be drawn." Cunningham, 48 Wash. App. at 44, 736 P.2d
at 308.
106. Id. (cited in Brief of Respondent School District at 5, Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash.
2d 122, 960 P.2d 424 (1998) (No. 65105-1).
107. Id. (citing Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 669 P.2d 451
(1983)).
108. See Cunningham, 48 Wash. App. at 44, 736 P.2d at 308. The plaintiffs in Cunningham
were the minor children of a mother who was struck by a car. The children neither witnessed the
accident, nor came upon the scene shortly after its occurrence. The court of appeals held as a
matter of law that the children could not recover for emotional distress. The court went on to
conclude:
Because the tort of outrage limits the plaintiff class and involves conduct of greater
severity then that required for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, we con-
clude that policy considerations dictate that the legal liability of defendants who
negligently inflict emotional distress must be limited to plaintiffs who are actually
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physical presence requirement articulated in Cunningham was
approved by the Washington Supreme Court in Gain v. Carroll Mill
Co.'09 In Gain, the family members of a state trooper killed by a truck
brought a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress based
upon their viewing of a television news broadcast relating to the acci-
dent.11 The Washington Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs'
claims for emotional distress damages were properly dismissed
because "the plaintiffs were not physically present at the scene of the
accident.' Later in the opinion, the court stated: "We conclude
that mental suffering by a relative who is not present at the scene of
the injury-causing event is unforeseeable as a matter of law. We reach
this conclusion after balancing the interests of the injured party to
compensation against the view that a negligent act should have some
end to its legal consequences. '"112
The Gain court further stated: "Other jurisdictions facing the
issue raised by this case and which have adopted the foreseeability
analysis comport with our holding. These cases require plaintiffs to
either witness the injury-causing event or see the victim immediately
after the accident.""' 3 Then, without explanation for broadening its
language, the Gain court concluded:
A defendant has a duty to avoid the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. However, this duty does not extend to those
plaintiffs who have a claim for mental distress caused by the
negligent bodily injury of a family member, unless they are
physically present at the scene of the accident or arrive shortly
thereafter. Mental distress where the plaintiffs are not present at
the scene of the accident and/or arrive shortly thereafter is
unforeseeable as a matter of law.114
Although the Gain court relied on several cases in dicta that were
considered questionable authority," ' that fact does not render the
placed in peril by the defendant's negligent conduct and to family members present at
the time who fear for the one imperiled.
Id. at 44, 736 P.2d at 308.
109. See Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 114 Wash. 2d 254, 260, 787 P.2d 553, 557 (1990).
110. Id. at 255, 787 P.2d at 554.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 260, 787 P.2d at 557.
113. Id. (citing Nancy P. v. D'Amato, 517 N.E.2d 824 (Mass. 1988); Croft v. Wicker, 737
P.2d 789 (Alaska 1987); Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038 (Alaska
1986); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986); Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1
(Cal. 1985); Waid v. Ford Motor Co., 484 A.2d 1152 (N.H. 1984)).
114. Id.
115. See Respondent School District's Brief at 9, Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash. 2d 122,
960 P.2d 424 (1998) (No. 65105-1); see also Gain, 114 Wash. 2d at 260, 787 P.2d at 557. The
cases cited in the Gain decision, see supra note 113, were also cited by the petitioner in Hegel as
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"shortly thereafter" language dicta. It does, however, further weaken
language that has little force to begin with." 6 In addition, Ochoa v.
Superior Court,"7 cited in Gain and by the plaintiff in Marzolf, is of no
assistance to the claimants."' As previously addressed, Ochoa held
only that the plaintiff can recover if the plaintiff both observes the
defendant's conduct and the resultant injury and is aware of both at
the time of the injury being caused." 9 Therefore, whether the plaintiff
arrived "shortly thereafter" was irrelevant.
It is worth noting that Washington Supreme Court rulings in
Gain, Hegel, and Cunningham-that a family member must be present
at the accident scene to recover damages for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress-comport with general pre-Thing cases from Cali-
fornia discussed previously.
However, the Thing court expressly stated, "the dictum in Ochoa
suggesting that the factors noted in the Dillon guidelines are not essen-
tial in determining whether a plaintiff is a foreseeable victim of a
defendant's negligence should not be relied on."' 20
If one concludes that the "shortly thereafter" language in Gain is
dicta, the law in Washington would still hold that a plaintiff seeking
emotional distress damages as a result of the negligent conduct toward
a third party must be a close family member who was present at the
scene and observed the negligent conduct causing injury.' In other
words, Washington would appear to apply the Dillon factors. 2
Indeed, up until recently, courts in Washington have continued
to follow the rule found in Dillon, that a plaintiff seeking emotional
distress damages due to the negligent conduct toward a third party
must have been present to observe the accident.'23 However, as the
next section will illustrate, this rule may no longer be valid.
authority for his position. Respondent School District's Supplemental Brief at 12-13, Hegel v.
McMahon, 136 Wash. 2d 122, 960 P.2d 424 (1998) (No. 65105-1).
116. See id.
117. 703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985).
118. The plaintiff in Ochoa was at the scene of the negligent conduct. See Ochoa, 703 P.2d
at 3-4.
119. Id. at 8.
120. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 830 (Cal. 1989).
121. See Respondent School District's Brief at 12, Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash. 2d 122,
960 P.2d 424 (1998) (No. 65105-1).
122. See id.
123. See Hegel v. McMahon, 85 Wash. App. 106, 112, 931 P.2d 184, 185 (1997).
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B. Washington Supreme Court's Recent Decisions on Bystanders'
Emotional Distress Claims
The modern obfuscation surrounding the recent Washington
Supreme Court case law indicates that, currently, bystanders need not
be present to bring a claim and recover for emotional distress.
In the recent case Hegel v. McMahon, the court expanded the
scope of bystander recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Plaintiffs in the consolidated case, Hegel and Marzolf,
sought to recover for emotional trauma they experienced after wit-
nessing the suffering of an injured family member at the scene of the
accident.124 Their claims at the trial court level were dismissed
because the plaintiffs were not present when the accident occurred.
However, the supreme court reversed the trial court and held that
"plaintiffs may recover for emotional distress caused by observing an
injured relative at the scene of an accident shortly after its occurrence
and before there is a substantial change in the relative's condition or
location.""12
1. Hegel v. McMahon
One night in October 1992, Dale Hegel ran out of gas and pulled
over to the side of the road. 126 As he poured gasoline into his tank, a
passing car struck him and knocked him into a ditch.127 Coinciden-
tally, members of the victim's family were driving along the same road
and came upon the scene of the accident shortly after its occurrence.
128
The victim's parents and son found him lying in the ditch, severely
injured and bleeding. 129  Moments later, Dale Hegel's brother and
sister-in-law also came upon the scene and saw him in the ditch. 3° As
a result of the accident, Dale Hegel suffered severe and permanent
head injuries.131
Those relatives who came upon the accident scene brought an
action against the driver for negligent infliction of emotional distress,
alleging that the sight of their close relative's injured body in the ditch
124. Hegel, 136 Wash. 2d at 122, 960 P.2d at 424.
125. Id. at 124, 960 P.2d at 425. The Washington Supreme Court decision remanded the
cases back to trial to decide the plaintiffs' emotional distress claims. Id. at 136, 960 P.2d at 431.
126. See Hegel v. McMahon, 85 Wash. App. 106, 107, 931 P.2d 181,182 (1997).
127. Id.






sent them into a severe state of fear and panic which escalated into a
prolonged sensation of anxiety and shock.'32
In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants asserted
that they owed no duty to the Hegels and that their interrogatory
answers did not allege sufficient objective symptoms of mental dis-
tress.133 The Hegels sought to amend their interrogatory answers to
include physical ailments caused by their emotional distress, but the
trial court refused to consider the amended answers because they con-
tradicted the Hegels' previous answers and were unsupported by
medical evidence. 34 The trial court then dismissed the case on the
grounds that the Hegels failed to show sufficient objective symptoms
of emotional distress. 3 The court held that a plaintiff cannot recover
for emotional distress caused by the tortious death of a family member
unless the plaintiff was present near the scene of the tort and observed
its occurrence.
136
The Washington Court of Appeals for Division Three affirmed
the summary judgment, but did not examine the sufficiency of the
symptoms. 137 Instead, the court held that the family members could
not recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress because they
did not witness the accident.1 3' The court acknowledged the presence
of the language in Gain suggesting that a family member who comes
upon the scene "shortly thereafter" an accident also may recover.'
39
But the court also pointed out that "later cases have declined to allow
recovery for plaintiffs who were not present near the scene and did
actually observe the injury-causing accident. 40 The court ruled that a
plaintiff must actually witness the injury-causing accident to bring a
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 4 ' The plaintiffs
then petitioned the Washington State Supreme Court for discretionary
review.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 124-25, 960 P.2d at 426.
134. Id. at 125, 960 P.2d at 426.
135. Id.
136. Hegel v. McMahon, 85 Wash. App. 106, 109, 931 P.2d 181,182 (1997).
137. Id. at 111-12, 931 P.2d at 183.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 110, 931 P.2d at 183.
140. Id. at 111, 931 P.2d at 183. (citing Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398,
1409 (9th Cir. 1994); Lindsey v. Visitec, Inc. 804 F. Supp. 1340 (W.D. Wash. 1992); Washing-
ton State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'ns v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299, 858 P.2d 1054
(1993)).
141. Id. at lll-12, 931P.2dat184.
142. See Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash. 2d. 122, 125,960 P.2d 424, 426 (1998).
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2. Marzolf v. Stone
On September 6, 1990, two days into the new school year, a
motorcyclist collided with a Snohomish school bus.' The motorcy-
clist, nineteen-year-old Jeremy A. Marzolf, was thrown from his
motorcycle sustaining broken arms, a severely fractured and nearly
amputated left leg, as well as serious chest and abdominal injuries.144
Jeremy was airlifted to Harborview Medical Center where he died
three hours later.
45
All the witnesses, including Jeremy's father, Barton P. Marzolf,
Sr., verified that Jeremy was conscious the entire time at the scene,
screaming in pain, attempting to stand up on a leg that he had not
realized he had lost, and writhing on the ground.'46
The plaintiff, Barton Marzolf, happened onto the scene of the
accident immediately following its occurrence and witnessed the griev-
ous personal injuries to his son.'4 7 The profound emotional damages
that this incident caused Barton were obvious to those who knew
him.'4 8 He constantly relived what he saw and heard at the scene
throughout his days and nights, and in his mind continued indefinitely
to see and hear it as vividly as at the time it happened.
14
Barton Marzolf brought wrongful death and negligent infliction
of emotional distress claims against Snohomish County, School Dis-
trict No. 201, and Bonnie Rae Stone, the driver of the bus.' The
defendants moved to dismiss the emotional distress claim on the
grounds that Mr. Marzolf was not at the scene when the accident
occurred.' Initially, the trial court denied the motion, but when the
court of appeals issued its decision in Hegel, the County moved for
reconsideration.5 2 After considering Hegel, the trial court granted the
motion to dismiss.5 3 Marzolf petitioned the Washington Supreme
Court for review and the two cases were consolidated.
143. Stacey Kollman, Snohomish Man Killed in Bus-Cycle Collision, SNOHOMISH COUNTY




147. Plaintiff Marzolf's Complaint for Damages at 9, Marzolf v. Stone, No. 93-2-05005-2
(Snohomish County Super. Ct. filed Sept. 3, 1993).
148. See Plaintiff Marzolf's Brief in Response to Defendant School District's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 8, Marzolf v. Stone, No. 93-2-05005-2 (Snohomish County Super. Ct.
filed Sept. 3, 1993).
149. See id.
150. See Hegel, 136 Wash. 2d 122, 125, 960 P.2d 424, 426.
151. Id. at 125, 960 P.2d at 426.
152. Id.
153. Judge Farris specifically reserved ruling if Mr. Marzolf was on the scene "shortly
thereafter" by arriving ten minutes after the accident. Order Denying Defendant Snohomish
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Chief Justice Durham, writing for the majority, stated the court's
reluctance to establish a bright line rule that would exclude plaintiffs
without meaningful distinction." 4 However, this area of tort law
requires a dedicated and lucid rule to maintain a system that is pre-
dictable. Unfortunately, with its ruling in this case, the Washington
court has made more work for itself in having to hear more potentially
fraudulent claims. The secondary problem found in Marzolf is that
the court fell prey to its own fear of creating an arbitrary distinction.
The court seemed so focused on justifying its position of allowing
recovery for relatives not at the scene, that it disregarded the omission
in the record of any corroborating medical evidence of objective symp-
tomatology'5 -an issue that both parties asked the court to decide,1
5 6
and a requirement that it expressly held was necessary to satisfy the
objective symptomatology requirement of the plaintiffs' emotional
distress claims. '
The fact that the plaintiffs' emotional distress was not suscepti-
ble to medical diagnosis or proved through medical evidence com-
pletely undermines the court's efforts to restrict subjective symptoms
such as unverified assertions of pain that have not been supported by
outside evidence or authoritative testimony. Undoubtedly, Mr.
Marzolf suffered when he witnessed the awful injury to his son. How-
ever, to prove his claim, the court's remand has effectively encouraged
plaintiffs to exaggerate their pleadings, and ultimately compels the
trial court to discount the reliability of psychiatric testimony that was
only requested after the state supreme court heard the appeal, and is
only now being obtained some nine years after the initial incident. 5 '
3. Is The "Shortly Thereafter" Language in Gain Mere Dicta?
As mentioned, the Gain decision included language not con-
tained in any prior Washington law. Gain stated that a plaintiff may
not claim damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress
unless she was physically present at the scene of the injury to her fam-
ily member or arrived "shortly thereafter."'5 9 The "shortly thereafter"
County's Motion for Reconsideration at 2, Marzolf v. Stone, No. 93-2-05005-2 (Snohomish
County Super. Ct. filed Sept. 3, 1993). By virtue of her ultimate decision, this issue became
moot at the trial level.




158. See id. at 122, 960 P.2d at 424.
159. Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 114 Wash. 2d 254, 261, 787 P.2d 553, 557 (1990).
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language in Gain was not necessary to decide the issue before the court
and, thus, constituted dicta.
It is apparent that the Marzolf case only came before the court
because the standard applied in Cunningham and further adopted by
Gain was blurred by this dictum. 6' Although the plaintiff in Marzolf
claimed that the "shortly thereafter" language constituted controlling
precedent in Washington, that language was argued by Defendant.
Snohomish County to be mere dicta that does not constitute a rule of
law. 6 ' The defendants prevailed on that point at the trial level.'62
The "shortly thereafter" language in Gain may be mere dicta for
several reasons. First, the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to
language used in a court opinion that was not necessary to decide the
issue in the case. 163 Moreover, a legal principle that is not applied to
the facts of a case does not become precedent. 64 The "shortly there-
after" language was not applicable to the facts of Gain because the
plaintiffs only learned of the accident while watching the account of it
on the television news. 165 Therefore, the issue of determining whether
the plaintiffs had arrived at the scene "shortly thereafter" the accident
was moot.
Secondly, the Gain court approved of the Cunningham court's
decision to limit the scope of a defendant's liability by restricting the
family members eligible to recover emotional distress damages to
those who were present at the scene of the injury-causing event.
166
Had the "shortly thereafter" language in Gain been the rule of law, the
Gain court would not have followed Cunningham, but rather would
have overruled or limited that case. 167 The Gain court did neither.
160. See Respondent School District's Brief at 7, Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash. 2d 122,
960 P.2d 424 (1998) (No. 65105-1); See also Gain, 114 Wash. 2d at 261, 787 P.2d at 557 (stating
that a plaintiff may not claim damages for emotional distress unless they were physically present
at the scene of the injury to their family member or arrived "shortly thereafter").
161. See Brief of Respondent School District's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Discre-
tionary Review at 2, Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash. 2d 122,960 P.2d 424 (1998) (No. 65105-1).
162. Snohomish County Superior Court Judge Farris granted the defendants' motion for
reconsideration because she held that Gain's language was dicta and allowed trial court judges
the opportunity to expand the holding in Gain to a case such as that presently before the court.
See Hearing for Reconsideration (March 24, 1997) at 10, Marzolf v. Stone, No. 93-2-05005-2
(Snohomish County Super. Ct. filed Sept. 3, 1993).
163. See State v. Yelle, 7 Wash. 2d 443, 450-51, 110 P.2d 162,166 (1941).
164. See State v. Zakel, 61 Wash. App. 805, 808, 812 P.2d 512, 514 (1991), cited by
Respondent School District's Brief at 8, Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash. 2d 122, 960 P.2d 424
(1998) (No. 65105-1).
165. See Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 114 Wash. 2d 254, 255, 787 P.2d 553, 557 (1990).
166. See Gain at 260, cited by Respondent School District's Brief at 8, Hegel v. McMahon,
136 Wash. 2d 122, 960 P.2d 424 (1998) (No. 65105-1).
167. See Respondent School District's Brief at 8-9, Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash. 2d 122,
960 P.2d 424 (1998) (No. 65105-1).
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IV. A RETURN TO A STRINGENT STANDARD TO
RESOLVE INCONSISTENT TREATMENT OF
BYSTANDERS' EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS
There is no question that the issue discussed in this Comment is
of considerable significance to persons like Barton Marzolf, Sr., and
the Hegel family members, who suffer devastating emotional damage
and impairment by living through the experience of witnessing a close
family member suffering physical injuries in the aftermath of a tort
proximately caused or contributed to by third parties. However, this
issue may be even more devastating to society as a whole, because if
we were to "hold actionable all emotional trauma causally connected
to a defendant's tortious conduct, we would wreak upon our society a
problem of unlimited or unduly burdensome liability.""16
The consolidated cases have not unearthed novel issues. Courts
across the country have struggled with such rules that propose to
expand or limit bystander recovery for emotional distress brought on
by witnessing the injury or death of a close relative.'69 "Interestingly
enough, the struggle has not necessarily been over jury verdicts, but
rather the confusing legal standards inconsistently adopted by the
various courts. ,1 70
No loss is greater than that of a loved one, and no tragedy is more
wrenching than the helpless apprehension of the death or serious
injury of a loved one. Claimants argue that the law should find more
than mere pity for one who is emotionally stricken by seeing that a
loved one has been critically injured or killed. However, this argu-
ment is rarely accepted by the general tortfeasor.
Tortfeasors have frequently argued that they should not have to
bear liability for the unforeseen consequences of their wrongful con-
duct.' 7' Tortfeasors will often argue for restrictions on the rights of
victims and for the establishment of artificial rules limiting recovery,
based on their skepticism of jurors' abilities to sort out fraudulent
claims. '72
The disparate judicial treatment of claims of intentional infliction
of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress
illustrates the concern with authenticating claims of emotional dis-
tress. Historically, courts have been apprehensive that psychological
injuries would be easy to feign and that suits would be brought for
168. Brooks v. Decker, 516 A.2d 1380, 1382 (Pa. 1986).
169. See generally Calandrella, supra note 14.
170. Petitioner Marzolf's Reply Brief at 4, Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash. 2d 122, 960
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trivial emotional distress complaints that were more dependent on the
peculiar emotional sensitivities of the plaintiff than upon the nature of
the tortfeasor's conduct. 173  Furthermore, courts have feared that
opening the courts to claims for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress would open the floodgates of litigation and lead to unlimited
liability for negligent tortfeasors. 174 Thus, courts have reasoned that
people should not be able to sue for everyday minor disturbances.
17 1
The tort of negligently inflicted emotional distress is clearly not
designed to compensate for all of the emotional traumas of everyday
life.
Nevertheless, courts have acknowledged that justice requires rec-
ognition of some claims for negligently inflicted emotional harm.
Thus, courts have devised various criteria to balance a plaintiff's com-
pensatory interests for emotional distress against the interests of the
judicial system in authenticating claims and preventing unlimited
liability for the tortfeasor.
176
Claimants will argue that a more stringent rule in this area of tort
law may preclude them from obtaining a remedy for the injury
because their case fails to meet the standard. Proponents of such a
rule would contend that without a definitive standard, "the result
would be inconsistent rulings in proliferating cases in the lower courts,
and inconsistent results for plaintiffs and defendants similarly situ-
ated. ' 1
77
A stringent standard should ensure that a defendant's liability is
reasonably related to her culpability. Such "[f]ortuitous circumstances
as whether a parent happens to arrive upon the accident scene or the
number of close family members who happen to arrive upon the acci-
dent scene should not determine the scope of liability for a defendant
who is negligent. 1 78 Certainly, a defendant should not be required to
173. See Dennis G. Bassi, It's All Relative: A Graphical Reasoning Model for Liberalizing
Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Beyond the Immediate Family, 30 VAL. U. L.
REV. 913, 922 (1996) (stating that the primary purpose for requiring physical contact has been to
deter plaintiffs from fabricating claims for emotional distress).
174. Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n. v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299,
321, 858 P.2d 1054, 1066 (1993).
175. See id.
176. The principles of tort liability requires that a defendant's breach of a duty of care
proximately causing a plaintiffs injury, have at some point along the causal chain, the passage of
time and the span of distance mandate a cutoff point for liability. Mazzagatti v. Everingham,
516 A.2d 672, 676 (Pa. 1986).
177. Respondent School District's Brief at 25, Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash. 2d 122, 960




anticipate the number of the victim's close relatives who may arrive at
the scene after an accident.'79
The Hegel court, in justifying its departure from the standard,
explained that an appropriate rule should not be based on temporal
limitations, but should differentiate between the trauma suffered by a
family member who views an accident or its aftermath, and the grief
suffered by anyone upon discovering that a relative has been severely
injured.8 '
Another policy consideration that pervades all cases in this area
of tort law is the need for rules that are feasible to administer and yield
a workable degree of certainty. Such considerations, no doubt, resulted
in the common law doctrine, applied in nearly all jurisdictions, that
negligence unconnected with physical injury will not provide the basis
for mental or emotional injuries, except in limited circumstances.
Otherwise, the nature of such unbridled negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress claims would cause exposure to the actor of indetermi-
nate classes, amounts, and times.'
In addition, if the cost is not borne by the individual defendant,
but rather is spread amongst society through the mechanism of insur-
ance, the focus should not be devoted to the rights of the individual
defendant, but should also address the needs of society to maintain a
system that is predictable. 2
Perhaps the best example of the need to return to a stringent
standard is shown by attempting to define the term "shortly thereaf-
ter." For example, in Gain's dissent, Justice Brachtenbach asked,
"what does 'shortly thereafter' mean? What magic elapse of time will
serve as the dividing line?"' 3 If the court was to set a finite time per-
iod for "shortly thereafter," it would invite litigation over how much
179. Id. at 25-26.
180. Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash. 2d 122, 131, 960 P.2d 424, 429 (1998).
181. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
182. See Respondent School District's Brief at 26, Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash. 2d 122,
960 P.2d 424 (No. 65105-1) (quoting Mazzagatti, 516 A.2d at 680 (Flattery, J. concurring)):
It is illusory to believe the public does not pay for tort recoveries, or that resources for
such are limitless. As it is with everything, a balance must be struck, in the end,
dealing with money, and that money must come from somewhere-from someone:
the public pays for the very most part by increased insurance premiums, taxation,
prices paid for consumer goods, medical services, and in loss of jobs when the manu-
facturing industry is too adversely affected.
See Respondent School District's Brief at 26, Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash. 2d 122, 960 P.2d
424 (No. 65105-1) (quoting Mazzagatti, 516 A.2d at 680 (Flattery, J. concurring)):
183. Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 114 Wash. 2d 254, 266, 787 P.2d 553, 560 (1990)
(Brachtenbach, J., dissenting).
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time elapsed and whose watch was correct." 4 If a jury is allowed to
determine what "shortly thereafter" meant on a case-by-case basis,
litigation over whether a jury will find that the parent or other close
relative arrived "shortly thereafter" would occur in every case. One
can only imagine the differing results and the extremes to which the
term "shortly thereafter" might be applied. Do we apply the term
only to those who fortuitously appear on the scene of an accident, or
do we also apply it to those who arrive on the scene after receiving a
telephone call regarding the accident?'
The term "shortly thereafter" in the context of relative bystander
recovery of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress is
capricious. A finite time limit on bystander recovery may also prove
unworkable. The only operable limitation, which policy and justice
dictate, is to limit recovery for those family members who are actually
present at the scene of the accident and witness the tortious conduct
itself. The standard has already been set in Washington. The Wash-
ington Supreme Court should take the opportunity to strengthen it,
not cloud the issue, as it has recently done in Hegel.
The recently established law in Washington is that a plaintiff
seeking damages for emotional distress as a result of the defendant's
negligence toward a third party must be a family member who is
pres??ent or arrives shortly after the time of the tortious conduct. As
the California Supreme Court observed:
The impact of personally observing the injury-producing event
in most, although concededly not all, cases distinguishes the
plaintiffs resultant emotional distress from the emotion felt
when one learns of the injury or death of a loved one from
another, or observes pain and suffering but not the traumatic
cause of the injury. Greater certainty and a more reasonable
limit on the exposure to liability for negligent conduct is possible
by limiting the right to recover for negligently caused emotional
distress to plaintiffs who personally and contemporaneously per-
ceive the injury-producing event and its traumatic conse-
quences.I16
V. CONCLUSION
This article has examined the need for the Washington Supreme
Court's clarification of the law of bystander recovery for negligent
184. Respondent School District's Brief at 27, Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash. 2d 122, 960
P.2d 424 (No. 65105-1).
185. Id.
186. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 828 (Cal. 1989).
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infliction of emotional distress. Part II examined the background of
the tort and showed that courts around the nation interpret it in a clear
and consistent manner. Part III examined the traditional law in
Washington and how the Washington Supreme Court has recently
rejected such law through the recent decision of Hegel and Marzolf.
Part IV examined the need to return to a standard for determining
legitimate claims, and argued that a return to clear-cut lines of cer-
tainty is needed. Regardless of whether the requirement is character-
ized as "physical presence" or a "sensory and contemporaneous
observance" of the accident, the requirement exists as a means to
reasonably limit the scope of a negligent defendant's liability.
